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Abstract
The charitable giving of UK households has changed considerably over the past 20 years. In
particular, the proportion of households giving to charity fell by 5 percentage points between 1974
and 1993–94. An increase in the average size of donations meant that total voluntary income
increased in real terms over the period, but, since 1988, voluntary income has stagnated. The
greatest falls in the number of givers are among households in their twenties and thirties. There
are clear trends in giving across households by age and income, with younger and poorer
households tending to give less. But not only are today’s younger households less likely to give
than today’s middle-aged households; they are also less likely to give than today’s middle-aged
households did when they were young. These generational trends in giving do not bode well for
levels of voluntary income in the future.
JEL classification: D12, D6.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Barclays/NGO Finance Index of the incomes of the top 100 charities shows a
stagnation in the growth of voluntary donations in recent years. As a proportion of
charities’ total incomes, voluntary donations fell each year from 19 per cent in
1992 to 17 per cent in 1996. Much of the recent debate on voluntary income has
focused on the impact of the National Lottery on individual giving. However,
evidence from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) presented in this paper shows
that charities face a long-term decline in the number of people making donations.
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Furthermore, the decline in the number of givers is greatest among younger
households. Not only are today’s younger households less likely to give to charity
than today’s middle-aged households, but they are also less likely to give than
today’s middle-aged households did when they were young. Unless this trend can
be reversed, the stagnation in voluntary income seems set to continue.
In this paper, we use FES data to describe who gives to charity and how much
they give. We find wide disparities in the level of giving between households by
age, income, education and region. We find evidence of a long-term decline in the
proportion of households giving to charity, which fell by 5 percentage points over
the period 1974 to 1993–94. We find no evidence in the FES that the introduction
of the National Lottery had a significant effect either on the number of givers or on
the size of donations.
1
Voluntary donations are only one source of income for charities. In fact, the
Barclays/NGO Finance Index shows that charities have been able to more than
compensate for the decline in voluntary giving with increased income from
investment and from grants and fees. But, independent of their value as a source of
income, voluntary donations represent one way in which individuals express their
support for the work of charities.
2 For this reason, the decline in donations may be
a matter of concern for the voluntary sector.
What has caused this decline in giving? To be plausible, the explanation must
fit the facts — that is, it must be consistent with a gradual and persistent decline in
the number of givers over a period of more than 20 years. We discuss three
possibilities — increasing income inequality, the decline in importance of religion
and recent changes in the role of charitable organisations.
II. WHO GIVES TO CHARITY?
The Family Expenditure Survey is an annual survey covering approximately 7,000
households each year. Adult household members are asked to keep two-week
diaries detailing everything on which they spend their money. Donations to
charities
3 are aggregated across household members and averaged across the two
weeks to provide a figure for household weekly spending on ‘charitable gifts’. In
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addition to the information in the spending diaries, household members are asked
in interview whether they make charitable deductions from pay and payments to
charities by bankers’ standing order or direct debit. The final total for ‘charitable
gifts’ therefore includes the weekly equivalent amount of charitable donations
through these planned methods of giving. It should be noted that this definition
does not include charitable expenditure that yields something to the donor in
return, such as expenditure on goods in charity shops and catalogues, payments
for attending charity events or purchase of raffle tickets. In practice, this may
constitute an important part of total charitable giving by individuals and
households.
In general, the expenditure information in the FES has been shown to be
reliable across time (see Tanner (1996)). In such a wide-ranging survey, however,
there may be a concern that not all gifts to charity — particularly small, one-off
donations — are recorded. In fact, the grossed-up FES total for charitable giving
by the whole population does match Charities Aid Foundation figures for total
income from individual giving.
In total, just under 30 per cent of the 7,000 households in the 1993–94 FES
were observed giving to charity during the two-week period over which they were
sampled, and the average amount given was £4.11 a week.
4 This average figure
conceals a skewed distribution — 40 per cent of donors gave less than £1 a week,
while at the other end of the distribution, 9 per cent gave more than £10 a week.
As Table 1 shows, the majority of giving is through prompted gifts as opposed to
planned methods such as deductions from pay (6 per cent of households) or
standing orders and direct debits (5 per cent). Planned methods of giving account
for around one-quarter of total donations.
There are clear differences in the pattern of giving across households according
to their total income and age. Richer households are more likely to give than
poorer ones, and the middle-aged are more likely to give than the young. Both
groups are also likely to give more. This is shown in Figure 1. For each income
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TABLE 1









Total giving 29.1 £4.11 £1.23
Prompted giving 23.2 £3.80 £1.17
Giving by standing order or direct debit 4.9 £4.84 £2.26
Giving by deductions from pay 5.7 £1.44 £0.30Fiscal Studies
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group and age-group, we show the proportion of households making a prompted
donation to charity, the proportion making a prompted donation and giving
through one of the regular forms of giving (standing order, direct debit or
deduction from pay) and the proportion making only a regular donation. The
number reported at the top of each bar is the average (mean) weekly donation for
all donating households within each group (in constant 1996 prices).
The proportion giving to charity increases from 14 per cent of the poorest 10
per cent of households to nearly half of the richest 10 per cent of households,
while the average size of donations rises from just over £2 a week among the
poorest 10 per cent to nearly £9 a week among the richest tenth. As a proportion
of income, poorer households actually give more to charity: the poorest 10 per cent
of households give 3 per cent of their income to charity, compared with the richest
10 per cent which give only 1 per cent of their income.
The age profile of giving is humped: the proportion of households giving to
charity increases as the age of the head rises, from just over 10 per cent of
households with head aged 18–24 to nearly 35 per cent of households with head
aged 45–54. Of course, the age of the head of the household and the level of
household income are likely to be positively correlated. In order to isolate the
effects of particular factors, such as income and age, we require a more formal
model of charitable giving.
FIGURE 1
Patterns of Giving
Title:  fig 1
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  27/10/97 9:46 am
Note: The number reported at the top of each bar is the average (mean) weekly donation for all donating households
within each group (in constant 1996 prices).Trends in Charitable Giving
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This raises an important question about how to treat the large number of
households that are not observed to give anything to charity in the FES sample. In
principle, there are three possible reasons why a zero observation may arise:
households may simply forget to record their donations, they may give only
infrequently and not be observed to give anything to charity during the two-week
sample period, or they may be genuine non-givers.
5 If zero observations do
represent non-givers and if the decision whether to give is non-random with respect
to the decision about how much to give, the set of givers is likely to be
systematically different from the set of non-givers. Estimating a model of giving
using only the non-zero observations will produce biased results. We therefore
model separately the decision about whether to give and the decision about how
much to give and condition on the probability of giving in measuring the effects of
different factors on the level of donations. This approach follows that of Heckman
(1979).
We estimate a model of giving on a pooled sample of households drawn from
10 years of FES data from 1984 to 1993–94. In total, this gives us a sample of
more than 70,000 households. As explanatory variables, we include on the right-
hand side the age of the head of household and household income, zero–one
dummy variables for education and employment status, proxies for household
wealth (namely, home-ownership and the number of rooms in the household) and
measures of household composition (number of adults, presence of children and
proportion of females in the household).
It is worth noting that we do not include any measure of the price of giving in
our estimation. In the US, there is a considerable literature on the effect of
taxation policy on donations, and estimated models of the level of giving typically
include individuals’ marginal income tax rates which determine the tax price of
giving (see, for example, Clotfelter (1980) and Reece and Zieschang (1985)). A
previous model of giving estimated using one year of FES data also included the
tax price of giving and found a small but significant negative effect (see Jones and
Posnett (1991)). However, this result was treated with some scepticism by the
authors, given that the extent of tax-free giving in the UK is limited and that
marginal tax rates could possibly have been picking up non-linearities in the effect
of income on charitable giving. However, given that we choose to exclude the tax
price of giving from our regression, we cannot ignore the possibility that the
coefficient on our income term may reflect an income effect as well as a price
effect, given that total income and marginal tax rates will tend to be positively
correlated.
TABLE 2
Estimated Results for a Model of Giving
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Effect on whether or not households
give to charity




A 10 per cent increase in income
increases the probability of giving by
1.2 percentage points.
A 1 per cent increase in total
expenditure increases the level of
donations by 1.1 per cent, implying





Increasing the age of the head by 10
years raises the probability of giving
by 3 percentage points.
Increasing the age of the head by 10
years increases the level of donations
by over 30 per cent.
Household
composition
Both a higher proportion of females
in the household and the presence of
children raise the probability of
participation — in the case of
children, by 3 percentage points.
The level of donations rises with the
proportion of females in the
household but the presence of
children makes no significant
difference.
Education Compared with the control group
(those with compulsory schooling
only), the effect of A levels is to raise
the probability of participation by 5
percentage points, while the effect of
college education is to raise it by 11
percentage points.
Compared with the control group
(those with compulsory schooling
only), the effect of A levels is to raise
the level of donations by nearly 40
per cent, while the effect of college




Compared with the control group (the
employed), the effect of being self-
employed is to reduce the probability
of giving by 11 percentage points,
while being out of work reduces it by
7 percentage points. Both these
effects are significant.
Those not in work are likely to give
significantly more than those in
employment — by 20 per cent
(conditional on their total spending).
There is no significant difference
between the employed and the self-
employed.
Region Compared with the control group
(Scotland), all other regions have
significantly lower rates of giving —
nearly 12 percentage points lower in
the south-east and around 6
percentage points lower in other
regions.
The size of the regional effects is
fairly large, with households outside
Scotland giving 50 to 60 per cent
less.
Quarter Compared with the first quarter of
the year, the probability of giving is
significantly higher in the second and
fourth quarters (by 3 and 4
percentage points respectively) and 1
percentage point lower in the third
quarter.
Compared with the first quarter of
the year, the level of donations is
significantly higher in the fourth
quarter (by 6 per cent) and
significantly lower in the third
quarter (by 9 per cent).
We summarise the results of our regression in Table 2. Income and age have
separate significant and positive effects both on whether or not households give toTrends in Charitable Giving
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charity and on the level of giving. The effect of total household spending on the
level of donations is positive, significant and greater than 1, implying that
charitable giving is a ‘luxury’ good — i.e. a 1 per cent increase in total real
spending would cause a rise in real charitable giving of more than 1 per cent.
Higher levels of education also raise both the probability of giving to charity and
the size of donations, independent of their effects on the level of income. The effect
of being out of work is to reduce the probability of participation, but to increase
the level of donations (conditional on total spending). The results also show that
households in Scotland are more likely to give than those in any other region and
are also likely to give more.
III. TRENDS IN GIVING
Evidence on giving over the period 1974 to 1993–94 shows a long-term decline in
the number of households giving to charity. Overall, the proportion of households
giving to charity fell by around 5 percentage points — from just over 34 per cent
in 1974 to just over 29 per cent in 1993–94 (see Figure 2). Against this downward
trend, the proportion giving by standing order or direct debit has more than
doubled — rising from just under 2 per cent in 1974 to nearly 5 per cent in 1993–
94. There has also been an increase in the average size of donations among those
who give to charity. The mean size of donation increased by more than £1.50 a
week in real terms — from £2.48 a week in 1974 to £4.11 in 1993–94. Similarly,
the median donation increased over the period from 84 pence to £1.23. Taken
together with the decline in the number of donors, this implies an
increase in the inequality of giving — that is, fewer people give, but those who do
FIGURE 2
Trends in Charitable Giving
Title:  fig 2
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  27/10/97 9:49 amFiscal Studies
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give give more.
The biggest decline is in giving by households in their twenties and thirties. The
evidence shows that younger generations of households are less likely to give to
charity than older generations. This can be seen by comparing age profiles across
time (summarised in Table 3). With the data presented in this way, it is relatively
straightforward to analyse the behaviour of different date-of-birth cohorts. This
can be done by starting with any age-group in 1974 (those aged 18–22 in 1974,
say) and tracing their behaviour across the 20-year period through successive age-
groups (aged 23–27 in 1979, 28–32 in 1984, 33–37 in 1989 and 38–42 in 1993–
94).
As in cross-section, the proportion of households giving to charity increases as
the age of the head of household increases. In 1974, aged 18–22, only 17 per cent
of households in the cohort give to charity. This increases to 32 per cent by the
time they are aged 38–42. However, the age profile of giving is flatter by cohort
than in cross-section. A participation rate of 32 per cent at age 38–42 for the
cohort of households aged 18–22 in 1974 compares with a participation rate of 39
per cent for those aged 38–42 in 1974. Also, a participation rate of 17 per cent for
households aged 18–22 in 1974 compares with a participation rate of just 6 per
cent among households aged 18–22 in 1993–94. Not only are today’s young
households less likely to give than today’s middle-aged, but they are also less
likely to give than today’s middle-aged when they were young. The cohort patterns
in giving are consistent with the overall trends in participation rates and in the
level of donations in Figure 2. If younger generations have lower levels of giving
than older generations, the overall proportion of households giving to charity will
TABLE 3
Cohort Profiles: Proportion Giving to Charity
Age 1974 1979 1984 1989 1993–94
18–22 17% 15% 15% 11% 6%
23–27 23% 22% 21% 18% 17%
28–32 31% 28% 27% 27% 22%
33–37 35% 33% 36% 30% 25%
38–42 39% 36% 40% 34% 32%
43–47 44% 45% 37% 39% 33%
48–52 40% 42% 50% 36% 39%
53–57 39% 33% 35% 35% 34%
58–62 39% 35% 31% 32% 32%
63–67 32% 30% 34% 31% 31%
68–72 32% 26% 28% 28% 31%
73–77 31% 26% 30% 28% 33%
78–82 26% 22% 31% 27% 30%Trends in Charitable Giving
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tend to decline over time. Also, as giving is increasingly concentrated among older
households, the average size of donations will tend to increase.
The introduction of the National Lottery sparked considerable debate about its
effect on the level of charitable donations. Clearly, to the extent that individuals
regard the proportion of Lottery money that is channelled to good causes as a
substitute for their own donations, they are likely to reduce the amount of money
given to charities in other ways. However, this raises a number of other issues.
One issue is why people play the Lottery — whether for a gamble, for fun or
because they see it as a way of giving money to charity. In fact, there is evidence
that people’s perceptions of how each pound is split up between prizes, profits,
taxes, retailers and good causes is fairly confused. A second issue is the
‘fungibility’ of the money given to good causes. If people perceive that a cash-
starved government (or other cash-starved individual donors) will take advantage
of Lottery money to reduce money given to charities, they may carry on giving to
charity themselves. Finally, it is not clear the extent to which money channelled
through the Lottery to a range of charitable organisations (decided by the National
Lottery Charities Board) is a substitute for individuals’ donations to a particular
organisation which may be favoured for personal or ideological reasons.
Ultimately, therefore, the question of whether the introduction of the National
Lottery affected individuals’ donations to charities is an empirical one.
The 1995 British Social Attitudes Survey asked respondents to say whether
they thought that buying National Lottery tickets would affect the amount given to
good causes in other ways. When asked about other people’s behaviour, there was
an almost equal division between those who thought that buying Lottery tickets
made no difference to the amount given and those who thought that less would be
given to good causes as a result. However, when asked about their own behaviour,
only 7 per cent thought that buying National Lottery tickets meant they gave less
to good causes in other ways. More than 92 per cent felt it had made no real
difference.
A simple comparison of giving before and after the introduction of the Lottery
shows a slight increase in the proportion of households giving to charity, but a
decline in the level of donations. But this does not capture the effect of the
introduction of the Lottery. Rather, we need to compare what actually happened
after the Lottery’s introduction with what would have happened if the Lottery had
not been introduced. This means controlling for other changes in households’
characteristics that may also have caused the level of giving to change. We
therefore extend our formal model of giving to include the period after the Lottery
was introduced and include in the estimation a dummy variable that takes the
value one if the Lottery was available. This will pick up any significant change in
giving behaviour since the introduction of the Lottery, controlling for changes in
other factors such as income. The results, given in Table 4, indicate that giving
behaviour is not significantly different from what it would have been in the
absence of the Lottery. The sign on the Lottery dummy in the regression on theFiscal Studies
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level of donations does indicate a fall in the amount given — by 10 per cent — but
this effect is not significant. That is, it is not possible to dismiss the hypothesis
that the Lottery has had no effect on household giving behaviour.
IV. DOES A DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF GIVERS MATTER?
Despite the fall in the number of households giving to charity, the total amount
given to charity over the period has increased. The increase in the size of donations
among givers has more than compensated for the falling number of givers. This
can be seen in Figure 3, which shows the average (mean) donation across all
households (including non-givers as well as givers). This increased from 86 pence
a week in 1974 to £1.18 in 1993–94 — an average increase of around 1.5 per cent
a year in real terms. However, the growth in total donations has not kept pace with
the growth in total consumer spending over the period, which was more than 2.5
per cent a year in real terms. Furthermore, the growth in average donations over
the period as a whole was due largely to a period of strong upward growth during
the 1980s. Since 1988, total donations have stagnated in real terms.
Of course, voluntary income is only one source of income for charities —
TABLE 4
The Effect of the National Lottery on Charitable Giving






Whether the Lottery is available 0.010 0.687 –0.101 –1.296
FIGURE 3
Average Donations: Givers and Non-Givers
Title:  fig 3
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  27/10/97 9:50 amTrends in Charitable Giving
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accounting for less than one-fifth of total income of the top 100 charities
according to the Barclays/NGO Finance Index. The index shows that the recent
stagnation in voluntary income has been more than made up for by increases in
income from investments (which grew by more than 50 per cent between 1992 and
1996) and income from grants and fees (which grew by more than 40 per cent over
the same period). The National Lottery alone has generated grants to charities
worth more than £1.3 billion during its first two years of operation.
6
However, these figures may present a potentially misleading picture of the
finances of the charitable sector as a whole. In part, this is because the charitable
sector is so heterogeneous that any statistics that attempt to describe it in
aggregate often tell us very little about trends in all its constituent parts. In
particular, the Barclays/NGO Finance Index is based on a sample of the top 100
charities, identified on the basis of average total income. Defining the top 100
charities in this way leads to the inclusion of many large bodies such as the
Church Commissioners for England and the Wellcome Trust which the public may
not typically think of as being charities. Also, the income trends of these large
bodies may be very different from those of small, local or single-issue charities,
and even from those of other charities in the top 100. For example, almost all of
the increase in investment income in the Barclays/NGO Finance Index was driven
by an increase in the investment income of the Wellcome Trust alone.
Furthermore, the health of the charitable sector cannot fully be assessed on the
basis of trends in its total income. This focus on ‘economism’
7 — that is,
measuring the sector by its economic weight alone — obscures the real value of
the charitable sector as an agent of social and cultural action and change. In this
context, the number of individuals giving to charity becomes an important
indicator in its own right of the health of the sector, rather than as just another
potential source of income. Individual philanthropy is a significant expression of
the individual’s relationship with the voluntary sector. Many fund-raising
campaigns are as important for the development of public awareness,
communication and support as for the actual level of income they raise.
The importance of individual philanthropy to the health of the charitable sector
is highlighted in the particular approach to measuring the ‘top’ charities that the
Charities Aid Foundation developed in the early 1980s, which ranked charities
explicitly according to their fund-raising abilities. On this basis, neither the
Wellcome Foundation nor the Church Commissioners of England is included in the
top 100 charities, but most of the organisations that the public would typically
identify as charities are. The income profiles of CAF’s leading charities (shown in
the Appendix) present a very different picture of the importance of voluntary
giving to the finance of the charitable sector: on average, voluntary income
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accounts for just over 70 per cent of the total income of the top 30 charities.
8
Furthermore, as we have argued, individual donations to charities represent one of
the major channels through which the public expresses its support for the work
done by charities. The question, therefore, is not just whether the fall in the
number of givers represents a threat to charities’ incomes, but whether such a fall
indicates some malaise in charities’ relationships with the public. If so, the fall in
the number of givers is a real cause for concern.
V. EXPLAINING THE FALLING NUMBER OF GIVERS
In this section, we discuss three possible explanations for the fall in the number of
givers. Any plausible explanation must be able to fit the facts — that is, it must be
able to explain a gradual, almost continuous decline in the proportion of
households making charitable donations over the last 20 years. The three
explanations that we discuss are increasing income inequality, the declining
importance of religious beliefs and the changing role of charitable organisations.
1. Income Inequality
The gap between rich and poor widened dramatically during the 1980s as a result
of the rich getting richer and the poor standing still. By 1991, for example, the
incomes of the poorest 10 per cent of households were no higher than they had
been in 1967 (see Goodman and Webb (1994) for further discussion). It is
plausible that this increase in income inequality may underlie the recent trends in
charitable giving. The results from our model of giving show that the level of
household income is a key determinant of whether or not people give to charity and
how much they give. Stagnant — and, in some cases, even falling — real incomes
among low-income households may have meant a fall in the number of givers,
while at the other end of the income distribution, real income growth would have
meant an increase in the average size of donations.
However, a comparison of households at different points along the income
distribution in 1984 and 1993 shows that there has been a fall in the number
giving to charity among rich and poor alike. If anything, as Table 5 shows, the fall
in the proportion of households giving to charity has been greatest in the middle of
the income distribution and smallest among households at the bottom of the
income distribution.
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Two further changes in households’ economic circumstances over the same
period are worth noting because of their possible effects on the number of givers.
First, since the late 1970s, there has been an increasing divergence between work-
rich (two-earner) and work-poor (no-earner) households and a near doubling in the
proportion of the adult population who are dependent on means-tested benefits (see
Gregg and Wadsworth (1996)). The results from our estimation show that the
head of the household being out of work has a further negative effect on the
probability of giving to charity in addition to any reduction in income caused by
unemployment. Households that are themselves dependent on state benefits are
unlikely to see themselves in any position to help others.
Second, at least part of the increase in income inequality has been driven by
rising levels of income volatility (see Blundell and Preston (1997)). Greater
uncertainty about future levels of income may cause an increase in precautionary
savings at a time when the role of the state in providing insurance during periods
of unemployment (for mortgage interest payments, for example) is diminishing. If
individuals are increasingly being required to look after themselves in a more
volatile world, their altruistic feelings may well be tempered.
2. The Role of Religion
One possibility is that the fall in the number of givers is linked to a decline in the
importance of religion. While this is difficult to measure directly, indirect
measures, such as church attendance, point to a steady decline in participation in
religious activity occurring over the same period as the fall in the number of givers
— for example, the adult membership of Trinitarian churches fell by one-sixth
between 1975 and 1990.
9 Furthermore, comparison across different age-groups
shows that the greatest fall in church attendance is among 15- to 29-year-olds,
exactly the age-group with the biggest fall in the number of givers.
There is evidence of a link between religious participation and donations to
charity. In the FES, the link is partly one of definition, since money given to
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TABLE 5
Charitable Giving, by Income Quintile
Proportion of households giving to charity
Income quintile 1984 1993
1 (bottom 20%) 15% 14%
2 24% 21%
3 (middle 20%) 33% 27%
4 40% 36%
5 (top 20%) 48% 45%Fiscal Studies
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church collections is included in the measure of charitable giving. But evidence
from the 1993 Individual Giving Survey shows that whether or not individuals
consider religion to be important to them has a significant effect on whether or not
they give to charity — conditional on their age, income, education and region of
residence. Those who consider religion to be very important are 9 percentage
points more likely to give than those who do not consider it important at all, while
those who consider religion to be quite important are 4 percentage points more
likely to give than those who do not consider it important at all.
Individuals’ religious beliefs may provide them with an ideological commitment
to support the work of organisations that share the same beliefs. Indeed, the list of
the top 50 fund-raising charities in the Appendix includes several religiously
motivated organisations, including Barnardo’s, Christian Aid and the Salvation
Army. More generally, individuals’ religious beliefs may affect their general
attitudes towards giving in general. For example, religion may provide an
additional moral imperative to ensure that altruistic individuals overcome the urge
to free-ride on others’ charity. An alternative, however, is that the decline in
church attendance and the decline in charitable giving may both be consequences
of broader social changes.
3. The Changing Role of Voluntary Sector Organisations
There is some evidence that trust in collective bodies — state, church and even
charities themselves — has been declining (see NCVO/Henley Centre (1997)).
One consequence of the perceived failings of the welfare state has been a greater
role for charities as direct providers of services. Government provision of public
goods is increasingly achieved via allocation of grants to outside organisations
(including charities) in accordance with the so-called purchaser–provider split. But
the images that make charities credible with the government as service providers
may do little for their credibility with individual donors. Partly in response to
changing government imperatives, charities are increasingly professional
organisations. Charities have seen an increase in contracted income and grants
from the government (and from the Lottery) relative to voluntary income, and, in
raising money from the general public, they approach individuals with targeted
marketing strategies instead of the collecting tin.
On the one hand, increasing professionalisation may be seen as an appropriate
response to falling trust in collective organisations and a way of trying to restore
public confidence in charities. On the other hand, it may only serve to alienate the
public still further. Trust plays a key role in the relationship between charities and
the public. One reason that individuals give to non-profit organisations rather than
to private organisations (possibly at the expense of greater efficiency in the private
sector) is because the absence of a profit motive provides them with some
guarantee that the money donated will wholly benefit good causes. However, the
unique role of charitable organisations may be threatened if non-profitTrends in Charitable Giving
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organisations are increasingly providing services in the same areas as (and
sometimes in direct competition with) governmental and private organisations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The charitable giving of UK households has been changing considerably over the
past 20 years. In particular, the proportion of households giving to charity fell by
5 percentage points between 1974 and 1993–94. An increase in the average size of
donations has meant that total voluntary income did increase in real terms over the
period, but, since 1988, voluntary income has stagnated.
Most worrying for the charitable sector is that the greatest falls in the number
of givers are among households in their twenties and thirties. There are clear
trends in giving across households by age and income, with younger and poorer
households tending to give less. But not only are today’s younger households less
likely to give than today’s middle-aged households; they are also less likely to give
than today’s middle-aged households did when they were young. These
generational trends in giving do not bode well for levels of voluntary income in the
future.
There has been some concern that the Lottery may have had an effect on the
level of giving. However, we find no evidence of any significant impact on either
the number of people giving to charity or the level of donations. Moreover, the
decline in the number of givers began long before the introduction of the National
Lottery. More plausibly, the decline in giving is linked to wider social and
economic changes, such as increasing income inequality and uncertainty and
changes in the role of charitable organisations.
APPENDIX














Oxfam 92,308 129,397 71%
National Trust 77,014 151,057 51%
Imperial Cancer Research Fund 70,980 80,431 88%
Cancer Research Campaign 60,211 66,221 91%
British Heart Foundation 57,204 64,992 88%
Royal National Lifeboat Institute 55,741 64,462 86%
Barnardo’s 47,300 96,057 49%
Help the Aged 43,178 52,453 82%
British Red Cross 38,446 95,221 40%
SCOPE 37,237 79,234 47%
Salvation Army 36,310 74,460 49%
NSPCC 35,091 44,782 78%
Marie Curie 34,316 44,372 77%
Cancer Relief Macmillan Fund 34,153 38,205 89%
Save the Children 33,075 84,385 39%
RSPCA 30,009 37,311 80%
Royal National Institute for the Blind 27,117 54,227 50%
RSPB 26,839 34,775 77%
Actionaid 26,015 37,321 70%
Christian Aid 22,919 39,545 58%
Guide Dogs for the Blind 21,554 28,700 75%
National Trust for Scotland 20,867 29,389 71%
Royal British Legion 20,751 29,802 70%
Tear Fund 20,573 23,277 88%
Institute of Cancer Research 18,922 24,529 77%
WWWF 17,716 21,145 84%
Charity Projects 16,935 21,364 79%
People’s Dispensary for Sick Animals 16,887 21,892 77%
Arthritis and Rheumatism Council 16,025 17,814 90%
Children’s Society 15,641 24,485 64%
Source: CAF Information Unit, 1997.
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